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SEPARATE AND NOT EQUAL: INTEGRATING CIVIL
PROCEDURE AND ADR IN LEGAL ACADEMIA
Jean R Sternlight*
INTRODUCTION
A popular poster in the 1970s explained that a woman without a
man was like a fish without a bicycle.1 Some might argue that the
relationship between civil procedure and alternative dispute resolu-
tion (ADR) is equally close, which is to say, not at all close. However,
this Essay urges that by treating ADR and civil procedure as two sepa-
rate fields, legal academia is doing a disservice to future legal practi-
tioners and to the public.
I. THE SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL WORLDS or CML
PROCEDURE AND ADR
Traditionally, academics specializing in ADR and civil procedure
have not tended to deal with each others' issues. The typical civil pro-
cedure course focuses on litigation. Commencing with personal and
subject matter jurisdiction, or occasionally with due process, the
course then moves on to cover such matters as the Erie2 doctrine, issue
and fact preclusion, and many aspects of litigation (complaints, an-
swers, discovery, motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, ap-
peals, etc.).3 A significant minority of civil procedure courses reverse
* Saltman Professor of Law and Director, Saltman Center for Conflict
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Resnik for helping to coordinate the American Association of Law Schools (AALS)
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version of this article. I am grateful for the research assistance of Michele Baron,
Kimberly Lou, Bryce Loveland, and Danielle Oakley. I am appreciative of the
financial support of the UNLV Boyd School of Law and of Michael and Sonja
Saltman.
1 For some background on the purported origin of this phrase, see John S. Al-
len, A Bit of Herstory, at http://www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Vista/3255/her-
story.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2004).
2 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
3 See, e.g., BARBARA ALLAN BABCOCK & TONI MASSARO, CvIL PROCEDURE: CASES
AND PROBLEMS (2d ed. 2001); JOHN J. COUND ET AL., CM 1L PROCEDURE: CASES AND
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the order of these topics, commencing with the "pleadings" portion of
the course before moving on to jurisdiction. 4
A third and unique approach is taken by the text written by
Professors Fiss and Resnik. 5 Aiming "to introduce the structural fea-
tures of all forms of legal procedure,"6 this text "probe [s] the concep-
tual continuities across adjudication, alternative dispute resolution
(ADR), and dispute resolution (DR) and among processes labeled
'civil,' 'criminal,' or 'administrative.' "7 Yet, while the Fiss/Resnik ap-
proach is something of an exception, and while most civil procedure
texts contain at least some mention of ADR, the ADR portion of the
course is usually small, whether measured in relative number of text
pages or class hours.8
MATERIALS (8th ed. 2001); RICHARD H. FIELD ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: MATERIALS FOR
A BASIC COURSE (8th ed. 2003); RicHARD D. FREER & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CIVIL
PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, AND QUESTIONS (3d ed. 2001);JOEL WM. FRIEDMAN ET
AL., THE LAW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS (2002); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD,
JR. ET AL., PLEADING AND PROCEDURE: STATE AND FEDERAL CASES AND MATERIALS (8th
ed. 1999); ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND PROBLEMS
(2003); A. LEO LEVIN ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 2000);
LINDA J. SILBERMAN & ALLAN R. STEIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THEORY AND PRACTICE
(2001); LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE (3d ed. 2004); STE-
PHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE (5th ed. 2000).
4 See, e.g., RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH (3d
ed. 2000); STEPHEN N. SUBRIN ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE, AND CON-
TEXT (2d ed. 2004).
5 OWEN M. FISS & JUDITH RESNIK, ADJUDICATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES: AN IN-
TRODUCTION TO PROCEDURE (2003).
6 Id. at 1.
7 Id.
8 See BABCOCK & MASSARO, supra note 3, at 779-810 (including thirty-one pages
on ADR in a chapter on decisionmakers and models in a 1214 page text); COUND ET
AL., supra note 3, at 1334-76 (including a forty-two page separate chapter in a 1376
page book); FIELD ET AL., supra note 3, at 3-4, 29, 125-28, 289-314, 974-75 (includ-
ing forty scattered references to phases of lawsuits, settlement, and other matters
throughout a 1486 page book); FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 822-49 (including a
twenty-seven page chapter in an 849 page book); HAzARD, supra note 3, at 47-48 (con-
taining a two page mention in the introduction of a 1410 page book); IDES & MAY,
supra note 3, at 24-38, 311, 383-84 (including seventeen pages of a 1180 page book,
the bulk of which are contained in a separate chapter); LEVIN ET AL., supra note 3, at
634-51 (including a seventeen page separate chapter in a 985 page book); MARCUS ET
AL., supra note 4, at 106-17, 444-79 (splitting forty-six pages between two chapters in
a 1200 page book); SILBERMAN & STEIN, supra note 3, at 1035-74 (including thirty-
nine pages in 1074 page book); SUBRIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 521-34 (including
thirteen pages of a 1033 page book); TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 3, at 17-21, 245,
252-53, 278, 373, 408, 499, 556, 600, 644, 785, 863, 883, 955 (including nineteen
pages in a 1022 page book); YEAZELL, supra note 3, at 576-627 (covering fifty-one
pages of a 1017 page book, contained in a chapter, entitled "Resolution Without
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My informal survey of civil procedure colleagues through the As-
sociation of American Law Schools (AALS) civil procedure listserve
revealed that few spend more than a day or two on ADR issues and
that most who do cover ADR treat it quite separately from the rest of
civil procedure. Those civil procedure professors who spend any time
on ADR most typically spend a day or so explaining to their students
the definitions of mediation, arbitration, and various other ap-
proaches to dispute resolution. Also, some civil procedure professors
discuss negotiation, often in the context of court-ordered settlement
conferences. A few civil procedure professors at least assign their stu-
dents to participate in role-playing exercises that enable them to be-
gin to think about how ADR is considered by practicing attorneys, 9
but even these exercises typically give students the impression that an
either/or choice can be made between dispute resolution processes.
While these discussions are certainly better than nothing, and do at
least give students the basic definitions of the various alternative
processes, they often do a poor job in helping students to understand
how fluidly disputes move among the various dispute resolution
processes. 10
Trial"). The Fiss and Resnik text contains the most material on ADR. See Fiss &
RESNIK, supra note 5, at 43-46, 431-532 (including 105 of 1221 pages, the bulk of
which are contained in chapter 4, entitled "Resolution Without Adjudication")
9 For example, some civil procedure professors use the "Daily Bugle" or "Burn-
ing Sailboat" exercises contained in RISKIN ET AL., INSTRUCTOR'S MANUAL WITH SIMULA-
TION AND PROBLEM MATERIALS TO ACCOMPANY DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS (2d
ed. 1997) and LEONARD L. RISIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND
LAwYERs (abr. 2d ed. 1998) 93-99, 119-43 (1998). Such exercises ask students to
counsel their imaginary clients on the choice of process or play out the same factual
dispute through negotiation, mediation, and arbitration.
10 As has been noted, the Fiss and Resnik text is an exception. Seeking to expose
students to procedural issues contained not only in civil litigation and ADR but also to
those present in criminal and administrative contexts, that text is in many ways more
revolutionary than the proposals made in this Essay. See Fiss & RESNIK supra note 5.
Also, in response to my informal survey, I learned of a few professors who seek to
weave ADR and civil procedure together in their courses. One, for example, (Lea
Vaughn) explains that she attempts to have both ADR and professional responsibility
permeate her course. For example, she spends time in the first few days discussing
disputes and how lawyers transform them, examining how the initial client interview
transforms the client's and lawyer's approach to the dispute, counseling students on
how to discern clients' interests as well as positions, and discussing when and how
ADR options should be considered. Later in the course she also uses exercises on
interviewing, mediation, and sometimes negotiation. Another professor (Jeffrey Par-
ness) spends significant time examining federal and state arbitration statutes, looking
at court-connected ADR, and examining courts' power to compel attendance and
participation in settlement conferences.
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Similarly, some pretrial litigation courses might contain a discus-
sion, invariably at the end of the course, about negotiation and/or
mediation.1' In those pretrial litigation courses that are based on
role-playing litigation of a particular dispute, students are sometimes
asked at the end of the semester to try to negotiate or mediate a reso-
lution to the dispute. While pretrial litigation is the course that prob-
ably best illustrates the way that litigation and other approaches
interrelate in practice, waiting until the very end of the course to con-
sider the role of settlement, mediation, and other approaches to dis-
pute resolution creates the misimpression that these forms of dispute
resolution are less common or less important than litigation.
Equally, the typical ADR course devotes little or no attention to
litigation, law, courts, or administrative institutions. The most fre-
quently offered ADR courses are the ADR survey, negotiation, media-
tion, and arbitration. 12 A few schools also teach other ADR courses,
including mediation clinics, mediation advocacy, cross-cultural negoti-
ation, and multi-party dispute resolution. Whereas the survey and ar-
bitration courses can be fairly large, the negotiation and mediation
courses are frequently capped at relatively low numbers, such as
twenty-four students.
ADR survey courses vary substantially, but the typical goal of the
survey is to expose students to the most important ADR topics: negoti-
ation, mediation, and arbitration. Often such courses focus more at-
tention on negotiation and mediation than on arbitration, and they
rarely discuss courts or how litigation relates to use or enforcement of
results achieved through ADR. 13
11 See, e.g., R. LAWARENCE DESSEM, PRETRLAL LITIGATION: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE
15-16, 533-629 (3d ed. 2001) (including ninety-eight pages on negotiation and ADR
out of a 631 page book); ROGER S. HAYDOCK ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF PRETRIAL LITI-
CATION 649-80 (5th ed. 2001) (including thirty-one pages on the "settlement process"
in a 694 page book); THOMAS A. MAUET, PRETRIAL 354-82 (5th ed. 2002) (containing
twenty-eight pages on settlement, including four pages on negotiation at a settlement
conference, out of a 382 page book); J. ALEXANDER TANFORD, THE PRETRIAL PROCESS
331-87 (2003) (including fifty-six pages on negotiation in a 387 page book).
12 According to a survey conducted in 2003 by the ABA Section on Dispute Reso-
lution, the survey course is listed by 141 schools, negotiation by 87, mediation by 79,
and arbitration by 50, of a total of 184 schools. Am. Bar Ass'n Section of Dispute
Resolution, 2003 Directory of Law School Dispute Resolution Courses and Programs, at
http://ww.abanet.org/dispute/directory.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2004). As noted
earlier, it should be recognized that schools do not necessarily offer, on a regular
basis, all courses that are listed in their catalogues.
13 See, e.g., STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, ME-
DIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 209-83, 375-426 (4th ed. 2003) (containing seventy-
four pages on arbitration and fifty-one pages on courts and ADR procedures in a 601
page book); ALAN ScoTT RAU ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF
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Some survey courses also cover interviewing and counseling, and
most spend some time on lesser known processes such as med-arb,
early neutral evaluation, summary jury trials, and mini-trials.' 4 Survey
courses often ask students to think about ADR processes from the per-
spective of the neutral, the lawyer, and policy makers. They fre-
quently include role-playing exercises and may also use videos, guest
lectures, group projects, or other creative pedagogical techniques as
well as lecture and discussion. ADR survey courses are often graded
based on papers, presentations, or projects instead of exams.
15
Negotiation courses typically focus on the skills and theory
needed to be a good negotiator. Frequently examining both problem
solving and distributive approaches to negotiation, as well as listening
skills, psychology, and economics, such courses usually provide stu-
dents with opportunities to participate in role-playing negotiation ex-
ercises. While some of these exercises place students in the role of
attorneys, many other exercises have students playing the role of an
individual negotiating on their own behalf. Negotiation courses rarely
spend much if any time on court-ordered settlement conferences or
the law or practical considerations on how settlement agreements can
or should be enforced.
16
LAWYERS 545-905 (3d ed. 2002) (containing fifty-one pages on courts and ADR proce-
dures and 308 pages on arbitration in a 962 page book); RISKIN & WESTBROOK, supra
note 9, at 502-88, 589-647 (containing fifty-eight pages on courts and ADR and
eighty-six pages on arbitration in an 800 page book). A forthcoming ADR survey of
which I am a co-author, CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION
PROCESSES: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL MODEL (forthcoming 2005), contains 163 pages
of 936 on arbitration, and contains 45 pages describing public hybrid processes that
largely bridge the worlds of litigation and ADR.
14 For examples of ADR texts, see GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 13; CARRIE
MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 13; RAU ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLU-
TION, supra note 13; RISKIN & WESTBROOK, supra note 9.
15 See samples of ADR syllabi listed at the AALS, Alternative Dispute Resolution
Section web page, at http://www.law.missouri.edu/aalsadr/DRsyllabi.htm (last up-
dated Aug. 31, 2004).
16 Some of the books used most frequently in negotiation courses are: ROBERT M.
BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, AND NEGOTIATING:
SKILLS FOR EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION (1990) (containing no pages on settlement
conferences or enforcement issues); ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES:
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVNG IN (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed. 1991) (con-
taining no discussion of enforcement or court processes); RUSSELL KOROBIN, NEGOTI-
ATION THEORY AND STRATEGY 426-62 (2002) (containing thirty-six pages on
enforcement issues in a 468 page book); ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WIN-
NING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES (2000) (containing no
discussion of courts or enforcement issues); MELISSA L. NELKEN, UNDERSTANDING NE-
GOTIATION (2001) (containing no discussion of enforcement issues or court
processes); ALAN SCOTr RAU ET AL., NEGOTIATION 296-326 (2d ed. 2002) (containing
2005]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Mediation courses typically attempt to teach students what media-
tion is, the differences between facilitative and evaluative approaches
to mediation, how mediation differs from other dispute resolution ap-
proaches, and what skills are needed to be a good mediator. Often
the first part of a mediation course is a short negotiation course, used
to teach students the difference between interests and positions and
to emphasize the need for a problem solving approach in mediation.
While many mediation courses include a unit on the lawyer's role in
mediation, i.e., mediation advocacy, this is often not the focus of the
course.17 Popular mediation texts, similarly, tend to focus more on
the process of mediation and the role of the mediator rather than on
the role of the lawyer in mediation. Mediation courses frequently
spend little, if any, time on court-ordered mediation, federal or state
statutes mandating or regulating mediation, or the law that has grown
up around the enforcement of agreements to mediate or agreements
reached in mediation.18
thirty pages on enforcement issues in a 326 page book); G. RICHARD SHELL, BARGAIN-
ING FOR ADVANTAGE: NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES FOR REASONABLE PEOPLE (1999) (con-
taining no discussion of enforcement issues). A number of negotiation courses also
have students read DOUGLAS F. STONE ET AL., DIFFICULT CONVERSATIONS: HOW TO DIS-
CUSS WHAT MATTERS MOST (2000), which does not focus on legal disputes at all.
17 See generally JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL., MEDIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE (2001);
JOHN W. COOLEY, THE MEDIATOR'S HANDBOOK: ADVANCED PRACTICE GUIDE FOR CIVIL
LITIGATION (2000) [hereinafter COOLEY, MEDIATOR'S HANDBOOK]; KiMBERLEE F. Ko-
VACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE (3d ed. 2004); CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE,
THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT (1986); see
also Alternative Dispute Resolution Section, Ass'n of Am. Law Schs., Dispute Resolution
Syllabi, at http://www.law.missouri.edu/aalsadr/DR-syllabi.htm (last updated Aug.
31, 2004) (containing a sampling of mediation syllabi).
18 See Suzanne J. Schmitz, What Should We Teach in ADR Courses?: Concepts and
Skills for Lauyers Representing Clients in Mediation, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 189, 210
(2001) (arguing that while the three major ADR texts do a thorough job of preparing
law students for issues facing mediators, they do not address as thoroughly those is-
sues facing lawyer representatives or advocates and that this focus is problematic be-
cause it gives students the sense that the mediator is the most important figure in the
mediation, while far more lawyers will serve as advisors or representatives in media-
tion than will serve as mediators). For examples of texts commonly used in mediation
courses, see JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL., supra note 17, at 244-55, 281-93 (containing
eleven pages on statutory requirements to mediate and thirteen pages on enforcing
mediated agreements in a 606 page book);JoHN W. COOLEY, MEDIATOR'S HANDBOOK,
supra note 17, at 247-49 (containing two pages on court enforcement and advocacy
issues in a 266 page book); KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, supra note 17, at 356-86 (contain-
ing thirty pages in a 520 page book); CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, supra note 17, at
248-61 (1986) (containing thirteen pages in a 298 page book). Even books focused
primarily on mediation advocacy focus little attention on court-connected processes
or enforcement of mediated agreements. See HAROLD I. ABRAMSON, MEDIATION REPRE-
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Arbitration courses are quite different than mediation and nego-
tiation courses. The typical arbitration course focuses on Supreme
Court cases dealing with commercial and/or labor arbitration.
Rather than teaching students to be arbitrators, or to be attorney-ad-
vocates within the arbitration process, the course more frequently ex-
amines case law on such issues as when and whether arbitration
clauses are valid, the nature of arbitrators' powers and authority, and
the circumstances under which arbitral decisions are to be enforced
or instead vacated.1 9 Most arbitration courses include substantial dis-
cussion of public policy issues. Some arbitration courses also include
role plays of arbitration hearings. Few arbitration courses spend
much, if any, time on non-binding arbitration, instead focusing far
more heavily on binding arbitration.
20
The separation between civil procedure and ADR can also be il-
lustrated by comparing the professors who teach the two courses. In
another article, I once described the divide between typical arbitrators
and mediators as "[p] in stripes meet birkenstocks." 21 While of course
stereotypical, the divide between civil procedure and ADR professors
has a similar feel. Anecdotally one might say that where civil proce-
dure professors tend to be more focused on rules, logic, and legal
analysis, ADR professors tend to be more focused on emotion, psy-
chology, and interdisciplinary connections: head vs. heart, adversarial
vs. problem-solving, even yang vs. yin. 2 2 While my attempts to find
actual objective differences based on the AALS biographies of these
two groups yielded surprisingly little of interest,23 perhaps if a Myers-
SENTATION: ADVOCATING IN A PROBLEM-SOLVING PROCESS (2004) (mentioning that
some mediation is court-ordered but containing no special discussion of court-con-
nected processes nor of enforcement); JOHN W. COOLEY, MEDIATION ADVOCACY
201-06 (2d ed. 2002) (containing five pages on court connected processes and en-
forcement in a 323 page text); DWIGHT GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES: EFFEC-
TIVE STRATEGIES FOR LAWYERS AND MEDIATORS 344-45 (1996) (containing one page on
the subject in a 530 page book).
19 See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE
OF ARBITRATION (3d ed. 2003) (containing no discussion of court-connected arbitra-
tion); CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHoZAL, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND PROBLEMS
(2002) (containing no discussion of court-connected arbitration); KATHERINE V.W.
STONE, ARBITRATION LAw, 587-623 (2003) (containing thirty-six pages of a 624 page
book on court-connected arbitration).
20 See texts noted supra note 19.
21 Jean R. Sternlight, Is Binding Arbitration a Form of ADR?: An Argument that the
Term "ADR" Has Begun to Outlive Its Usefulness, 2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 97, 102.
22 Perhaps those few of us who teach both courses have a foot in each camp.
23 Analyzing a sampling of both civil procedure and ADR professors reveals that
the two groups are quite similar with respect to a variety of objective factors. Using
the AALS Directory of Law Teachers (2003-2004), I compared twenty-two ADR
2005]
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Briggs or other psychological examination were administered to
groups of civil procedure and ADR professors, the differences would
be significant.
24
ADR professors often train students to think differently than they
do in their other courses such as civil procedure. Professor Susan
Sturm has called the typical approach to legal education the "'gladia-
tor' model," in that it focuses primarily on "analytical rigor, tough-
ness, and quick thinking. ' 25 By contrast, ADR courses tend to be less
adversarial in their orientation, focusing more on class discussion, ex-
ercises, and group projects as a means to help students learn not only
the law but also the psychology and counseling techniques necessary
to be a good lawyer.
26
As for equality, it is clear that civil procedure has a privileged
position in legal academia relative to ADR. Although every law school
now lists in its catalogue at least one ADR course, 27 and the status of
ADR has greatly improved in recent years, 28 it is civil procedure and
not ADR that is required to be taken by all law students. 29 As well, the
professors to twenty-two civil procedure professors, all of whom had ten or more years
of teaching experience. Whether I included or excluded those ADR professors who
focus on labor arbitration, I found remarkable consistency in terms of age, gender,
years of practice experience and other factors I thought to examine.
24 For more information on the Myers Briggs Type Indicator, see http://
www.myersbriggs.org (last visited Nov. 14, 2004).
25 Susan P. Sturm, From Gladiators to Problem-Solvers: Connecting Conversations About
Women, the Academy, and the Legal Profession, 4 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 119, 121
(1997).
26 For an early symposium studying how ADR can be taught, see Symposium,
Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Law Curriculum, 34J. LEGAL EDUC. 229 (1984); see
also Janet Reno, Lawyers as Problem-Solvers: Keynote Address to the AALS, 49 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 5, 6 (1999) (emphasizing that law schools must do a better job of teaching
students to be problem solvers and not just litigators); Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation
and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. LJ. 29, 43-48 (1982) (describing the different "philosophi-
cal map" contained in the heads of prototypical litigators and ADR practitioners).
27 See Am. Bar Ass'n Section of Dispute Resolution, supra note 12 (listing 887
courses and programs at the 184 ABA approved law schools). According to the study,
all 184 schools listed in the directory offer at least one dispute resolution course; 141
schools list a dispute resolution survey course; 50 schools list a course focused on
arbitration; 79 schools list a course focused on mediation; 87 schools list a course in
negotiation. Of course, it is possible that some of these listed courses are not offered
on a regular basis.
28 Back in the 1980s, few law schools offered any ADR classes. See, e.g., Robert B.
Moberly, Introduction: Dispute Resolution in the Law School Curriculum: Opportunities and
Challenges, 50 FLA. L. REv. 583, 585-86 (1998) (describing the growth of support
within the legal community for ADR course offerings).
29 There are a few exceptions. The University of Missouri-Columbia now requires
all first-year law students to take a course tidled "Lawyering" that focuses substantially
[VOL. 80:2
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upper-level course offerings in litigation and civil procedure are more
plentiful than those in ADR,30 mock advocacy opportunities focus on
appellate and trial disputes, 31 and the Bar exam typically tests on civil
procedure but not ADR.3 2 The end result of the separate and not
equal status of ADR is that our students graduate with far greater ex-
posure to litigation than to other forms of dispute resolution. They
also graduate with a sense that these two fields are quite distinct from
one another. To the extent that litigation students study ADR they
often get the idea that the choice between litigation and other ap-
proaches, is made once, at an early stage in the dispute, and that there
is little or no fluidity between litigation and the other processes. That
is, law students often imagine that lawyers say to clients: "We will nego-
tiate or mediate rather than litigate this dispute." For some students
(whom I privately label "granolas") -those who are uncomfortable
with the adversary process-this option sounds very attractive. They
like the idea of resolving a dispute collaboratively with the other side,
and also appreciate the possibility of looking to interests that are not
purely legal in nature. For other students-those who see themselves
as gladiators aiming to protect their clients through ultimate adver-
sarial behavior-the ADR option seems wimpy and undesirable. They
plan to avoid ADR altogether. Yet, as the subsequent sections will
show, both views are misguided.
on ADR. See University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law, For Current Students: Cur-
riculum, at http://www.law.missouri.edu/current/curriculum/index.htm (last up-
dated Oct. 4, 2004).
30 A study of the top four law schools from each U.S. News and World Report tier
reveals that more than twice as many litigation-related upper-level courses are listed as
compared to ADR courses. Michele Baron, Survey of Schools' Offerings in Civil Pro-
cedure & ADR (2004) (on file with author). This statistic likely undercounts the dis-
parity, in that more ADR courses than litigation courses likely have limited
enrollment caps.
31 A study of the top four law schools from each U.S. News and World Report tier
reveals that the vast majority of mock advocacy experiences are appellate arguments,
some are mock trial, and only a few are focused on client counseling, negotiation, or
mediation. Michele Baron, Summary of Schools' Litigation and ADR-Related Compe-
titions (2004) (on file with author).
32 The web site for BAR/BRI, a private company that coaches students for the Bar
exam, reveals that evidence is tested on the Multistate Bar Exam and that state and
federal rules of civil procedure are often tested by essay. ADR is not mentioned. See
BAR/BRI, Bar Exam Information: Subjects Tested, at http://www.barbri.com (last visited
Sept. 22, 2004).
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II. CIVL PROCEDURE AND ADR ARE INTEGRATED IN PRACTICE
The relationship between civil procedure and ADR in practice is
far different than in the academy. Looking at dispute resolution from
the perspective of court administrators, private contracts, or private
attorneys, one sees that there is a real-world blending between litiga-
tion and other dispute resolution approaches. Thus, whether one
practices in federal court, state court, or before administrative agen-
cies, "litigators" are now ADR practitioners. 33 Equally, ADR practi-
tioners are typically also litigators, unless they practice exclusively as
neutrals. While some initial advocates of ADR may have hoped that
such processes would be totally distinct from litigation, the reality is
that, increasingly, disputes commenced in ADR may later be liti-
gated.3 4 Also, disputes commenced in court increasingly are directed
to ADR.
A. Court and Agency Connected Programs
Court and administratively connected ADR programs were one of
the biggest ADR stories of the 1990s. The federal Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 199835 mandated that every federal district court
"shall authorize ... the use of alternative dispute resolution processes
in all civil actions."3 6 Similarly, most states now require that many
33 Martin Shapiro made this point over twenty years ago, observing that "media-
tion and litigation are invariably intimately interconnected and interactive rather
than distinct alternatives for conflict resolution." MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COM-
PARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS viii (1981).
34 This is true not only for arbitration, where awards are often confirmed or possi-
bly vacated in court, but also for mediation. See Peter N. Thompson, Enforcing Rights
Generated in Court-Connected Mediation- Tension Between the Aspirations of a Private
Facilitative Process and the Reality of Public Adversarial Justice, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP.
RESOL. 509, 512 (2004); see alsoJamesJ. Alfini & Catherine G. McCabe, Mediating in
the Shadow of the Courts: A Survey of the Emerging Case Law, 54 ARK. L. REV. 171, 173
(2001) (discussing court enforcement of mediation agreements); Ellen E. Deason,
Enforcing Mediated Settlement Agreements: Contract Law Collides with Confidentiality, 35
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 33, 41-42 (2001) (discussing contract and mediation in the con-
text of settlement enforcement); Duane W. Krohnke, Mediation's Case Appearances Are
More Frequent in 1998, 17 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 1, 173 (1999) (discussing
enforcement of mediation agreements).
35 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (2000).
36 Id. § 651(b); see also ROBERTJ. NIEMIC ET AL, GUIDE TO JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT
OF CASES IN ADR (2001); ELIZABETH PLAPINGER & DONNA STIENSTRA, FED. JUDICIAL
CTR. & CPR INST. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ADR AND SETTLEMENT IN THE FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURTS: A SOURCEBOOK FORJUDGES AND LAWYERS (1996) (describing federal
programs).
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cases filed in court be taken through an ADR process before the dis-
putants should have access to a judge or jury.
37
The shrinking number of trials has led to a major investigation by
the American Bar Association (ABA) and leading academics into the
causes underlying the "vanishing trial."' 38 The demise of bench and
jury trials is certainly attributable to many factors besides ADR.
39 As
well, it is important to emphasize that cases can be disposed of
through many means that are neither trial nor settlement.
40 Still, it is
striking how many more disputes filed in court are now resolved
through ADR rather than trial. The latest federal court statistics show
that just 1.86% of filed cases were resolved through trial, 1.21%
through jury trial, and 12.87% by dispositive motion.
4' The state
court figures, while more variable, are similar.
42
By contrast, large numbers of cases filed in federal or state court
are now resolved through ADR, and especially settlement.
43 While
37 One article states that as of 1994 "[a] t least 46 states and some 1,200 courts
now have some form of official ADR program in place." S. Gale Dick, ADR at the
Crossroads, Disp. RESOL. J., Mar. 1994, at 50.
38 See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Tial: An Examination of Trials and Related
Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMp. LEG. STUDS. 459 (2004). Other articles on
this subject are contained in the same issue of the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies.
39 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Migrating, Morphing, and Vanishing: The Empirical and
Normative Puzzles of Declining Trial Rates in Courts, 1 J. EMP. LEG. STUDS. 783 (2004)
(observing that the diminution in the numbers of trials in federal court may be due to
a combination of the migration of trials to other venues such as administrative tribu-
•nals, as well as to a privatization of dispute resolution through increased reliance on
ADR).
40 One of my pet peeves, as a civil procedure and ADR professor, is how often I
see and hear the statistic that 95% or 97% of cases settle. This is simply false. While
1.8 or 3 or 5% of cases may go to trial in a particular jurisdiction, a significant number
of the cases that do not go to trial are for example resolved by courts, on motions to
dismiss or for summary judgment. See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 38, at 483-84.
41 See Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Judicial Statistical Inquiry: Federal
District-Court Civil Cases, at teddy.law.cornell.edu:8090/questata.htm (last visited Oct.
16, 2004) (providing access to federal court statistics for 2000).
42 Information complied regarding twenty-two states by the Court Statistics Pro-
ject for the National Center for State Courts shows that from 1976 to 2002, jury trials
fell from 1.8% to 0.6% of total civil dispositions. In that same period, bench trials fell
from 34.2% to 15.2%. Galanter, supra note 38, at 507 tbl. 4; Brian J. Ostrom et al.,
Examining Trial Trends in State Courts: 1976-2002, 1 J. EMP. LEG. STUDS. 755, 768
(2004).
43 In fiscal year 2000, 53% of federal cases were dismissed, other than for lack of
prosecution, default judgment, consent judgment or on pretrial motion, and 18.5%
of cases resolved on "other" grounds. See Eisenberg & Clermont, supra note 41.
Figures obtained from the National Center for State Courts with respect to twenty-
seven states show that the percentage of cases ending in settlement or dismissal was
47%, with an average of 28% of cases resolved through "other" means. Court Statis-
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data on the precise number of disputes sent to or resolved through
facilitated ADR such as mediation or arbitration has proved quite elu-
sive, it is clear that many disputes are now being sent to either private
or court-connected ADR.4 4 ADR devotees may sometimes criticize
court programs, implying or even stating that such programs do not
represent "real" ADR, charging that they are too evaluative or too fo-
cused on concerns of efficiency as opposed to individual empower-
ment.45 Nonetheless, for better or quite possibly for worse, these
court-connected experiences are what many attorneys know as ADR.46
Additionally, there is a very close linkage between certain ADR
approaches and some dispute resolution programs typically catego-
rized as part of civil procedure. How does one distinguish between
court-ordered settlement and pretrial conferences and determina-
tions rendered by magistrates and special masters on the one hand,
and ADR processes on the other?47 Given their obvious commonali-
ties it is not surprising that the two sets of processes raise similar is-
tics Project, Nat'l Ctr. For State Courts, GeneralJurisdiction Court Civil Manner of Disposi-
tions for 27 States, 2001 (on file with author); see also Galanter, supra note 38, at 507
tbl.4 (reporting that for the period 1976-2002, data provided for twenty-two states
showed that civil jury trials fell from 1.8% to 0.6% of dispositions, and that the num-
ber of bench trials fell from 34.3% to 15.2%).
44 See Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the "Vanishing Trial" The Growth and Im-
pact of "Alternative Dispute Resolution," 1 J. EMP. LEG. STUDS. 843, 846-47 (2004); Ga-
lanter, supra note 38, at 514-15.
45 See Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, "Evaluative" Mediation Is an Oxymoron,
14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 31 (1996). For two excellent discussions on the
nature of court-connected mediation, see Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Con-
nected Mediation: What's Justice Got to Do with It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787 (2001) [herein-
after Welsh, Making Deals]; Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in
Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARv. NEGOT. L.
REv. 1 (2001).
46 See Roselle L. Wissler, Barriers to Attorneys'Discussion and Use of ADR 19 OHIO
ST.J. ON Disp. RESOL. 459, 461-62 (2004) ("[A] ttorneys' ADR use often is the result of
ajudicial referral... rather than the result of a voluntary, mutual agreement by both
parties .... ); see also Bobbi McAdoo & Art Hinshaw, The Challenge of Institutionalizing
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Attorney Perspectives on the Effect of Rule 17 on Civil Litigation
in Missouri, 67 Mo. L. REV. 473, 475 (2002) (describing ADR as a more routine part of
the civil litigation process with the implementation of ADR programs in many state
court systems).
47 Edward Brunet puzzles over the significant commonalities between judicial set-
tlement conferences and mediation. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Judicial Mediation and
Signaling, 3 NEV. L.J. 232, 233-35 (2003) (observing that judges tend to use an evalua-
tive mediation style, as opposed to a facilitative technique). For a discussion of settle-
ment conferences and other dispute resolution processes, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33
UCLA L. REV. 485 (1985).
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sues, such as whether good faith participation can be compelled,
4
whether and when discovery should be permitted prior to the pro-
cess, 49 and the standards under which a particular outcome might be
appealed. Devices such as special masters, summary jury trials, and
short trials 50 lie on a divide between litigation and ADR.
Administrative agencies, similarly, are increasingly using ADR
methods to resolve disputes in a less adversarial fashion.
51 At the fed-
eral level, ADR is now widely used by such agencies as the Internal
Revenue Service, 52 the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion,53 the General Services Administration (which handles govern-
ment procurements), 54 and the Air Force.55 While mediation has
48 Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 16 (allowing a judge to order a party, as well as its
attorney, to attend a settlement conference), with John Lande, Using Dispute System
Design Methods to Promote Good-Faith Participation in Court-Connected Mediation Programs,
50 UCLA L. REv. 69, 69 (2002) (discussing rules used to compel parties to attend or
participate in mediations).
49 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b) (3) allows ajudge or magistrate to hold a
scheduling and planning meeting, at which the judge or magistrate may limit the time
for discovery so that the process can be completed before any judicial settlement con-
ferences, thereby increasing the chances of settlement at the conference. In the ADR
context, the question of the proper timing of discovery has frequently been discussed.
50 See infra notes 153-65 and accompanying text for a description of the "short
trial" used in Nevada.
51 Use of ADR at the federal level was spurred by passage of the Administrative
Dispute Resolution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736 (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-583 (2000)).
52 See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 § 3465(a),
26 U.S.C. § 7123(b) (2000) ("[A] mediation or alternative dispute resolution
("ADR") process is currently available in certain cases."), available at http://
www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=9748
7 ,00.html.
53 See Policy Statement on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 3 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA)
No. 229, at N:0181 (July 17, 1995), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/
adrstatement.html.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is firmly commit-
ted to using alternative methods for resolving disputes in all of its activities,
where appropriate and feasible. Used properly in appropriate circum-
stances, alternative dispute resolution (ADR) can provide faster, less expen-
sive and contentious, and more productive results in eliminating workplace
discrimination, as well as Commission operations.
Id.
54 See U.S. Gen. Serv. Admin., Office of Gen. Counsel: Gen. Law Legal Counsel, at
http://www.gsa.gov (last visited Sept. 22, 2004) ("The General Law Division is respon-
sible for managing the agency's alternative dispute resolution (ADR) program. The
General Law Division's attorneys coordinate and conduct the agency's nationwide
ADR training program. The General Law Division represents GSA in interagency
ADR working groups.").
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proved particularly popular,56 some of the U.S. agencies are also using
other methods of dispute resolution including non-binding arbitra-
tion, partnering, and an ombuds process. 57 At the state level, simi-
larly, ADR is often used to handle such issues as workers'
compensation, 58 condominium disputes, 59 and construction defects. 60
In short, courts and many administrative agencies are now requir-
ing that many cases filed as litigation matters proceed through ADR
as, at minimum, a prerequisite to later litigation. While there is tre-
mendous variation among jurisdictions and between practice areas,
court-connected ADR has now come to dominate the work of some
courts. In the Eighth Judicial Circuit in Nevada, for example, all cases
brought for $40,000 or less must proceed through non-binding arbi-
tration. 61 The practical effect of this requirement is that roughly fifty
percent of civil cases in which answers are filed proceed through non-
binding arbitration. 62 Of these, seventy-five percent are resolved,
meaning that no de novo trial is sought following the non-binding
arbitration. 63 Similarly, Florida now requires that virtually all civil
55 See Mary L. Walker, Dep't of the Air Force, Endorsement of Air Force ADR Pro-
gram, at http://www.adr.af.mil (last visited Sept. 22, 2004).
As the General Counsel of the Department of the Air Force, I proudly en-
dorse our Air Force Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Program Office.
The Air Force ADR Program is the exemplar program in the federal govern-
ment, having received numerous awards for its efforts to bring resolution to
costly and time-consuming disputes.
Id.
56 See JEFFREY M. SENGER, FEDERAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION: USING ADR WITH THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT (2004).
57 See Philip J. Harter, Federal Dispute Resolution Coming of Age, Disp. RESOL. MAG.,
Winter 2004, at 24 (reviewing SENGER, supra note 56).
58 See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.460 (West 1993 & Supp. 2004).
59 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.501(1)(1) (West 1993 & Supp. 2004).
60 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 40.680 (Michie 2002 & Supp. 2003).
61 See NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. 38.250 (Michie 2002 & Supp. 2003) (effective
through Dec. 31, 2004).
62 Arbitration Commissioner Chris A. Beecroft, Jr., reports that in 2003, answers
were filed in 7107 civil cases, and arbitration files were opened in 3687 of those cases.
E-mail from Chris A. Beecroft, Jr., Arbitration Commissioner, Nevada Eighth Judicial
Court District, to Jean R. Sternlight, Professor of Law, Boyd School of Law, University
of Nevada, Las Vegas (July 20, 2004, 7:34 AM PST) (on file with author). During the
first half of 2004, answers were filed in 3698 cases and 1819 of these were assigned to
arbitration. Id.
63 See Chris A. Beecroft, Jr., Eighth Judicial District Court, Arbitration, at http://
www.accessclarkcounty.com/district-court/arbitration.htm (last visited Sept. 22,
2004).
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cases go to mediation. 64  In many jurisdictions, mediation is
mandatory at least with respect to child custody disputes. 65 Some
praise the huge role of court- and agency-connected ADR 66 and
others are more critical, 67 but it is clear that the phenomenon of
court- and agency-connected ADR has had a major impact.
B. Contractual ADR
ADR is also increasingly called for in contracts parties may have
entered prior to when the particular dispute arose. For example, in
certain fields such as construction,68 international business, 69 and
franchising,70 many, if not most, contracts call for arbitration, perhaps
preceded by negotiation and/or mediation, should a dispute arise.
Virtually all securities brokers require their customers to arbitrate fu-
ture disputes.
71
In other areas, although predispute dispute resolution agree-
ments may not be the norm, they are increasingly common. Many
employers now offer or require that their non-unionized employees
64 See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.700. The exceptions to this rule are: bond estreatures,
habeus corpus and extraordinary writs, bond validations, civil or criminal contempt,
and other matters as may be specified by administrative order of the chiefjudge in the
circuit. Id.
65 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.1 (2003) (requiring child custody disputes to
be mediated); NEv. 8TH JUD. CIR. R. 5.70 (requiring mediation of all child custody
disputes before a judge may hear them).
66 The movement toward court-connected ADR has been praised for saving time
and money, increasing disputant satisfaction, and providing more choices to dispu-
tants. Louise Phipps Senft & Cynthia A. Savage, ADR in the Courts: Progress, Problems,
and Possibilities, 108 PENN ST. L. Riv. 327, 327-28 (2003).
67 See Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR A Critique of
Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 2169, 2170 (1993) (argu-
ing against mandatory federal arbitration programs); Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Clos-
ing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST.J. ON Disp. RESOL.
211, 212 (1995) (examining the future of ADR).
68 See, e.g., Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Multi-Door Contract and Other Possibilities, 13
OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. REsOL. 303 (1998) (using construction contracting as a model).
69 See, e.g., GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 7 (2d ed.
2001).
70 See Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Clauses in Franchise Agreements: Common
(and Uncommon) Terms, 22 FRANCHISE L.J. 81, 81 (2002) (reporting that slightly less
than half of the studied franchise agreements contained arbitration clauses); Edward
Wood Dunham, Enforcing Contract Terms Designed to Manage Franchisor Risk, 19
FRANCHISE L.J. 91, 91 (2001) (stating that arbitration and mediation agreements are
important for franchisors in franchise agreements).
71 See Barbara Black, The Irony of Securities Arbitration Today: Why Do Brokerage Firms
Need Judicial Protection?, 72 U. CIN. L. REv. 415, 447 (2003).
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resolve legal claims with the employer through arbitration; 72 consum-
ers are often required to arbitrate disputes with lenders, manufactur-
ers, or service providers; 73 and mediation and other forms of ADR are
increasingly used with respect to health care disputes.74
The existence of all these ADR contracts means that many dispu-
tants who previously would have litigated will now, instead, at least
begin the dispute resolution process through a non-litigation form of
dispute resolution. Although a client may go to an attorney anticipat-
ing a trial as the solution to her problem, the attorney may well read
the relevant contractual documents and conclude that litigation is
foreclosed or at least must follow a non-binding form of ADR.
C. Post-Dispute Agreements to Use ADR
Even when ADR is not compelled by either court rules or pre-
dispute contracts, some parties voluntarily agree to resolve their dis-
putes through negotiation, mediation, arbitration, or another form of
ADR. Sometimes this choice is made pre-suit, and other times after
the suit is filed. We know that far more litigated disputes are resolved
through settlement than any other means. 75
72 See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
73 One study showed that the "average Joe" consumer in Los Angeles was re-
quired to arbitrate disputes arising out of roughly one-third of the consumer transac-
tions in his life. Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, "Volunteering" to Arbitrate
Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
55 (2004). See generally David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business:
Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REv.
33 (arguing that contractual arbitration clauses systematically reduce corporate de-
fendants' legal liability); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the
Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996) (critiqu-
ing the Supreme Court's support for binding arbitration clauses).
74 See Scott Forehand, Helping the Medicine Go Down: How a Spoonful of Mediation
Can Alleviate the Problems of Medical Malpractice Litigation, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL.
907, 926 (1999); Elizabeth Rolph et al., Arbitration Agreements in Health Care: Myths and
Reality, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1997, at 154; Nancy Neveloff Dubler, Heroic
Care Cases: Wen Difficult Decisions About Care Are Near, Mediation Can Help Bridge Com-
munications Gap, Disp. RESOL. MAG., Spring 1999, at 7.
75 Federal court statistics for 2000 show that 1.86% of civil cases were resolved by
trial, 1.21% through jury verdict, and 0.65% by dispositive motion. See Eisenberg &
Clermont, supra note 41; see also Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Econom-
ics, and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 77 (1997)
("[A] pproximately ninety to ninety-five percent or more of civil lawsuits not dismissed
by courts in the early stages of litigation settle short of trial."); Stephen C. Yeazell, The
Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 631, 638
(" [P] retrial activity that does not result in dispositive adjudication is producing fewer
abandoned cases and twice as many settlements as was the case fifty years ago.").
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D. The Intertwining of ADR and Litigation
Despite the great prevalence of ADR, it has by no means replaced
litigation. Instead what we see is a real intertwining and intermingling
of dispute resolution techniques. Just as negotiation takes place in the
shadow of the law, 76 so too does ADR more generally take place in the
shadow of litigation. But, it is also true that litigation takes place in
the shadow of ADR. A few examples will help make the point.
At an early stage, litigation can be used to determine whether a
particular dispute can or must be sent to ADR given relevant statutes,
court rules, or contractual agreements. The Supreme Court has now
heard numerous cases as to whether particular disputes are subject to
contractual arbitration agreements. 77 Jurisdictional issues can be im-
portant with respect to matters intended to be resolved through ADR,
just as they can for litigated matters.78 Indeed, and rather ironically,
the typical arbitration course is based almost exclusively on litigated
cases. 79 Similar disputes can arise with respect to negotiation, media-
tion, or non-binding arbitration, as judges may be called upon to de-
termine whether a particular contract, court rule, or statute requires
that a particular dispute be taken through one of those processes.80
Once it has been determined that a particular dispute will be sent
to ADR, litigation is still highly relevant. When participating in a non-
binding form of ADR such as a settlement conference, mediation, or
non-binding arbitration, parties will often consider their litigation op-
76 See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (examining how the legal system
affects private negotiations upon dissolution of marriage).
77 See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000); Doctor's
Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
78 See, e.g.,Jean R. Sternlight, Forum Shoppingfor Arbitration Decisions: Federal Courts'
Use of Antisuit Injunctions Against State Courts, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 91 (1998) (examining
application of federal jurisdiction doctrines to question which court can and should
handle motions to compel arbitration).
79 See, e.g., CARBONNEAU, supra note 19; DRAHoz~A, supra note 19; STEPHEN K.
HUBER & E. WENDY TRACHTE-HUBER, ARBITRATION CASES AND MATERIALS (1998);
STONE, supra note 19.
80 See, e.g., Kirschenman v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 166, 168 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1994) (holding that the trial court lacked statutory or other authority to require
parties to commercial litigation to participate in mediation despite an oral agreement
between the parties to do so); Annapolis Prof'l Firefighters Local 1926 v. City of An-
napolis, 642 A.2d 889, 895 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) (enforcing a written agreement
to submit a future dispute to a form of ADR); Prod. Credit Assoc. v. Spring Water
Dairy Farm, Inc., 407 N.W.2d 88, 91-92 (Minn. 1987) (en banc) (upholding statutory
requirements to participate in mandatory mediation in good faith).
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tion as their BATNA-"best alternative to a negotiated agreement."81
Thus, litigation options, or the lack thereof, will affect the nature of a
negotiated or mediated resolution and will impact a party's decision
on whether or not to seek a trial de novo following issuance of a non-
binding arbitration award. Moreover, litigation may be used to re-
solve disputes that arise during a negotiation, mediation, or non-bind-
ing arbitration, such as whether a subpoena may be used or discovery
obtained, who may or must or may not participate in the hearing, or
whether or not parties participated in the process in good faith.82
With respect to binding arbitration, courts may be asked to intervene
to order preliminary relief,83 enforce a subpoena,8 4 or help run an
arbitral class action.8
5
After a dispute has seemingly been resolved through a non-litiga-
tion process, litigation may still have a role. Disputants may litigate
the validity of the resolution that was supposedly reached;8 6 whether
or not things that were said or done in the course of ADR are pro-
tected by privilege8 7 or a confidentiality agreement;88 or how a settle-
ment agreement can be enforced against a non-cooperative party.89
Similarly, issuance of a binding arbitration award does not end litiga-
tion. Courts may, for example, be involved to enforce the arbitrator's
award,90 to vacate that award,91 or to consider whether an arbitral
award precludes subsequent legal actions based on principles of res
judicata or collateral estoppel.92
81 See FISHER & URY, supra note 16, at 97-106 (introducing "BATNA" as an abbre-
viation for "best alternative to negotiated agreement").
82 For an article discussing the good faith issue, see Lande, supra note 48.
83 2 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AwARDs, AND
REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION Acr § 25 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
84 3 id. § 34.2.1.2 (1994 & Supp. 1994).
85 See Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action,
Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 39-44 (2000) (discussing
courts' possible role in running arbitral class actions).
86 One frequent issue is whether oral agreements are enforceable. See, e.g., Cata-
mount Slate Prods., Inc. v. Sheldon, 845 A.2d 324 (Vt. 2003).
87 See, e.g., Rojas v. Superior Court, 93 P.3d 260, 264 (Cal. 2004).
88 See, e.g., NLRB v. Joseph Macaluso, Inc., 618 F.2d 51, 56 (9th Cir. 1980).
89 See, e.g., Cary v. Cary, 894 S.W.2d 111, 111 (Tex. App. 1995); In re Marriage of
Ames, 860 S.W.2d 590, 594 (Tex. App. 1993).
90 See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2000) (governing the confirmation of arbitration awards
in federal court).
91 See, e.g., 9 U.S.C.A. § 10 (West 1999 & Supp. 2004) (governing the vacating of
arbitration awards in federal court).
92 For a discussion of this issue, see G. Richard Shell, ResJudicata and Collateral
Estoppel Effects of Commercial Arbitration, 35 UCLA L. REv. 623 (1988).
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E. The Practitioner's Experience of ADR and Litigation
In short, in the world of practice, ADR and litigation are inextri-
cably linked. Few practitioners involved in the representation of cli-
ents9 3 can say that they only litigate or that they only are involved with
ADR. While some have suggested that clients ought to employ one
lawyer to litigate their disputes and another to try to settle that dis-
pute,94 such dual representation is obviously expensive and only
makes sense, if at all, in cases involving significant sums. Thus, the
typical attorney must keep litigation alternatives in mind while work-
ing on negotiation, mediation, or arbitration, and must equally con-
sider ADR alternatives while drafting complaints, filing motions, and
conducting discovery on behalf of her client. The "litigation" attorney
must be prepared to counsel a client as to when it makes sense to
employ an alternative to litigation and as to when a particular settle-
ment is desirable. Even an attorney who focuses particularly on repre-
senting clients in mediation, negotiation, or arbitration ought to be
aware of litigation options and also potential litigation implications
depending on whether or how the matter is resolved in ADR.
It is not easy for a lawyer to pursue or even consider both ADR
and litigation options simultaneously, as the two approaches may re-
quire quite different mindsets. 95 The divergence between approaches
is most stark when one contrasts the less adversarial forms of ADR,
mediation, and negotiation to litigation. To be an effective negotiator
or an effective advocate in mediation one must consider the weak-
nesses of one's own position and the strengths of the opponent's posi-
tion. One must also be prepared to focus on interests outside of the
narrow litigation box. Yet these open-minded traits may undercut the
93 Obviously those practitioners who work exclusively as mediators or arbitrators
do not have direct involvement with litigation. On the other hand, those practition-
ers who work as judges do increasingly find themselves conducting settlement confer-
ences or mediations as well as judging cases.
94 See, e.g., Roger Fisher, What About Negotiation as a Specialty?, 69 A.B.A. J. 1221,
1223 (1983) (suggesting the need for professional negotiators); Gary Mendelsohn,
Lawyers as Negotiators, 1 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 139, 148-66 (1996) (arguing that given
divergences between the incentives and psychology of a lawyer and a client, it may
often be preferable to retain separate negotiation counsel); Marguerite S. Millhauser,
Gladiators and Conciliators: ADR." A Law Firm Staple, B. LEADER, Sept.-Oct. 1988, at 20,
21 (urging that ADR specialists can help clients and attorneys to consider nonlitiga-
tion options, convince other parties to participate in a particular process, and negoti-
ate ground rules).
95 Cf Chris Guthrie, The Lawyer's Philosophical Map and the Disputant's Perceptual
Map: Impediments to Facilitative Mediation and Lawyering, 6 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 145,
149 (2001) ("[L]awyers are unlikely to possess the personalities, predispositions,
skills, and training necessary to mediate in a purely facilitative, non-evaluative way.").
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effectiveness of the pure litigator, whose goal is to represent her cli-
ent's case in the most favorable light possible. The attorney who is too
good at seeing the weaknesses in her own case and the strengths in
the opponent's case may not be particularly good at writing a brief or
making an oral argument on her client's behalf.96 Exceptional attor-
neys may be capable of handling both tasks well.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE REAL WORLD INTEGRATION OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE AND ADR
To what extent are we, as legal academics, adequately recognizing
the ways in which traditional civil procedure and ADR relate to one
another? I suggest that we can do a much betterjob, both as teachers
and as scholars.
A. Academia Needs to Improve the Teaching of Dispute Resolution
As has been discussed, litigation and ADR are typically taught sep-
arately, with a great deal more attention being paid to the former than
to the latter. The following section will focus on how this situation
might be improved.
1. Improving Litigation Courses
We need to find a way to teach students how litigation and vari-
ous ADR techniques relate to one another in practice. That is, our
students need to learn that litigators are almost always thinking about
settlement and that negotiators or participants in other ADR
processes are often thinking about their litigation options and alterna-
tives. Students in litigation courses should also learn that ADR is
often required by either court rules or contract, so that litigation will
not always be an option. Our litigation students additionally ought to
learn that there is a great deal of law and litigation that is relevant to
ADR processes such as how arbitrations are handled, when settlement
agreements are enforceable, and how rules of mediation confidential-
ity should be applied.
96 See id.; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Wen Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes of Its Own:
Conflicts Among Dispute Professionals, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1871, 1932 (1997).
Lawyers, especially litigators, know best how to litigate and how to fight in
that controlled environment. ADR, at least in some forms, has required law-
yers and some parties to solve problems in different ways-to consider fu-
ture interests, on-going relations, long-term effects, implications for third
parties, and even the public relations of the choices they make in litigation.
Id. Riskin, supra note 26, at 37-41 (discussing the positive and negative implications
attorney involvement can have in mediation).
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Our students should not graduate thinking that they have the
choice either to take a dispute to litigation or to seeks to resolve it only
through ADR, as the real world often blends these options together.
We disserve both those students inclined to be gladiators and those
students who are uncomfortable with adversarialness by failing to ex-
plain how closely ADR and litigation are often tied together. While
many disputes do settle, it is often in the context of filed or at least
threatened litigation. The lawyer who announces to the other side
that she only wants to negotiate and not litigate thereby almost inevi-
tably weakens her settlement position.
97
I suggest that litigation courses such as civil procedure and pre-
trial litigation should contain five key elements pertaining to ADR.
First, students of litigation ought to be taught to consider whether a
case should be filed in court at all, and what other alternatives might
exist at the time of filing. Although deciding whether to file a claim is
a fundamental part of what lawyers do, few civil procedure or pretrial
litigation courses focus on this question. Instead, most begin with the
filing of the complaint, at which point the critical decision to file has
already been made. Even those pretrial litigation courses that contain
a unit on interviewing and counseling do not necessarily cover this
question, but may instead take for granted that the interview ought to
result in the filing of a lawsuit. Second, and relatedly, we need to
explain to students the definitions of and distinctions between the ba-
sic types of ADR. These processes are far too common for us to be
graduating students who are unaware of these basics. We need to
help our students to learn how to choose among these processes at
appropriate times. Third, students of litigation ought to be taught
that court-ordered ADR is commonly a part of litigation, and that con-
tracts increasingly call for ADR instead of litigation. We should not be
graduating students who will be surprised when courts require them
to participate in non-binding arbitration, mediation, or settlement
conferences. For those of us who teach in schools where many gradu-
ates will remain in-state, it makes sense to explain the approaches of
the local state court. Those of us with more national students can
instead focus on the approaches of typical federal courts. Fourth, we
need to teach our students that ADR and litigation are inextricably
linked, in practice. We ought to provide examples of how disputes
97 Note, however, that in the family law context there is a growing trend toward
"collaborative" law, whereby the lawyer for both sides contract with their clients not to
litigate the dispute. If settlement efforts fail the clients must retain different attor-
neys. SeeJohn Lande, Possibilities for Collaborative Law: Ethics and Practice of Lauryer Dis-
qualification and Process Control in a New Model of Lawyering, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1315, 1356
(2003).
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move easily between the two sets of processes, and we need to point
out that the choice of processes is not made just once, at an early
dispute resolution stage. Fifth, and perhaps most critically, as we dis-
cuss procedural justice and due process, we must encourage students
to consider whether less-formal procedures can be as just or more just
than formal adversarial approaches. It is wrong for our discussions of
justice to take for granted that litigation is the best way to resolve
disputes.
For those who accept my argument thus far, the critical question
is: how can these insights be taught, particularly given the incredible
time pressures already felt by most civil procedure professors?
Whereas civil procedure was once typically taught as a two-semester,
six-credit course, an increasing number of schools have now chosen to
limit the course to five or four credits, sometimes taught in a single
semester.98 While this shrinkage has also been imposed upon other
first-year teachers, we civil procedure professors (of course) tend to
believe we have been affected most severely. There is just so much
critically important material to convey in civil procedure: the nature
of courts (federal and state, trial and appellate), pleadings (com-
plaints, answers, amendments, discovery, motions to dismiss and for
summary judgment, pretrial conferences, impleader, counterclaims,
cross-claims, class actions), personal jurisdiction, subject matter juris-
diction and removal, res judicata and collateral estoppel, choice of
law, the Erie doctrine, jury trials, and due process. A recent AALS
conference on civil procedure revealed that few of us cover all of these
subjects, much less also covering ADR.99 Thus, it is not surprising that
respondents to my informal survey frequently pleaded that they
taught little or no ADR in civil procedure, often seeking to justify the
omission on the theory that their school had several specialty courses
devoted to the subject.
This response is understandable. Indeed, I myself feel victimized
by these very same pressures and must admit that I too have some-
times devoted less time to teaching about ADR in civil procedure than
is probably desirable. Yet, upon reflection, I believe many civil proce-
dure professors err critically in failing to focus their students' atten-
tion sufficiently on ADR. First, those civil procedure professors who
fail to teach about ADR on the theory that their students can take
98 UNLV Boyd Sch. of Law, Curriculum Comparison Survey (2003) (on file with
author). UNLV surveyed forty-six law schools. Twenty-seven of these schools limit
civil procedure classes to three, four, or five credits. Civil procedure is taught in one
semester for all fifteen schools that limit the course to three or four credits. Id.
99 AALS Conference on Civil Procedure: The Many Faces of Contemporary Civil
Procedure (June 15-20, 2003).
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electives on the subject disserve their students by furthering the con-
ception that litigation and ADR are separable. Many students will not
take ADR courses, even to the extent that they are available, because
they will not realize how critical ADR is to the practice of both liti-
gators and transactional attorneys. Second, a professor need not ex-
pend large numbers of hours to bring some level of understanding of
ADR to the attention of their students. By permeating discussions, or
even mentions, of ADR throughout the course, and particularly doing
so from the outset, professors will teach their students that ADR is
integral to today's practice of litigation. The following are some ideas
on how to cover the five areas I have identified as most critical. It
turns out that civil procedure professors will not need to extensively
supplement the casebook in order to convey the material I believe is
most important.
a. To Claim or Not to Claim
From an empirical standpoint, students should understand that
many gripes do not lead to lawsuits. The work of Richard E. Miller
and Austin Sarat,100 though now somewhat outdated, makes this point
very well using a nice pyramid graphic. Our students need to know
that many people, without consulting a lawyer, make the determina-
tion (consciously or not) not to pursue what might have been a legal
claim.
We also need to explain to our students that lawyers play an im-
portant gatekeeping role in helping their clients to decide whether it
makes sense to pursue legal action. Many students may assume that
plaintiffs' lawyers file claims on behalf of all persons who solicit legal
advice when, of course, this is not so. I have found that it is useful to
have students work through a cost/benefit analysis. What are the po-
tential benefits to commencing legal action and what are the possible
detriments? Whereas students and some professors may focus prima-
rily or entirely on the legal merits of a claim, lawyers know that many
other considerations are also relevant. Thus, I teach that in terms of
the potential benefits of bringing a litigation claim, clients should
consider the following: (a) their likelihood of convincing a court/jury
that they are right (and note that this turns on available evidence as
well as law, since a claim may be true but not provable), (b) the likely
remedy that a court would afford if the client prevails, and (c) possi-
ble non-legal gains, e.g., psychic satisfaction or positive publicity or
improvement in company morale. As to potential detriments of litiga-
100 Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the
Adversary Culture, 15 LAw & Soc's REv. 525, 544 (1981).
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tion, lawyers should help their clients consider: (a) the likelihood that
they will lose (again considering facts as well as law), (b) the financial
costs of litigation (including attorney fees and costs but also consider-
ing costs to the client's business), and (c) non-financial costs such as
loss to reputation or psychic harm.
How are these concepts best taught? I suggest that they can be
taught through any and every case in any civil procedure book. All
that is required is a little imagination. For example, I use the Marcus
and Redish casebook, 10 1 and the first case in the book is Band's Refuse
Removal, Inc. v. Borough of Fair Lawn.10 2 The casebook authors in-
cluded this case in order to help students understand the adversary
system, as the judge in the case goes far beyond what most would con-
sider the appropriate role of the judge in an adversarial system. How-
ever, before I get into that aspect of the case I have the students
consider how they would have counseled plaintiff with respect to the
desirability of litigation had plaintiff come to them, prior to filing suit.
Specifically, I have them break into groups of three or four and think
about this question in advance. In class, I do a counseling exercise in
which I play the role of the president of Band's Refuse Removal, Inc.,
and have the students explain my options and the costs and benefits
of taking various steps. They can also ask me for more information
that they may need in order to advise me. I use the blackboard to
enumerate the pros and cons of filing a claim, and the students
quickly see that sometimes it is preferable for a client to take no ac-
tion than to embark on a course of litigation.103 To provide this sort
of advice students must consider not only the strength of the client's
legal claims, but also their client's underlying interests. For example,
how important is it, from a financial standpoint, for Band's Refuse
Removal, Inc., to pursue this litigation? Will there be political, reputa-
tional, psychological, or other benefits or costs to pursuing the
litigation?
The "litigate or not" lesson can be taught again using other cases
in the book. In teaching Pennoyer v. Neff,10 4 for example, one can in-
quire how Mr. Neff and his attorney should have gone about deciding
whether it made sense to file litigation against Mr. Pennoyer. What
were Mr. Neff's goals? What were his options? What should he have
101 MARCUS ET AL., supra note 4.
102 163 A.2d 465 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960).
103 This sort of exercise can also be used to briefly explore professional responsi-
bility issues such as how the relationship between the attorney and the client should
function. That is, a professor could ask students to consider which decisions should
be made by the attorney and which by the client.
104 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
(VOL. 8o:2
SEPARATE AND NOT EQUAL
seen as the costs of pursuing such litigation? Periodically throughout
the course I suggest that the professor should ask students to consider
why the plaintiff chose to file suit and what other options might have
existed. When I teach civil procedure, like many other professors, I
have students read either A Civil Action10 5 or The Buffalo Creek Disas-
ter.10 6 These books are ideal for helping students to think about
whether and when the litigation option makes sense. For example, I
ask the students to imagine themselves in the position of one of the
real life characters in these books and to draft a short essay explaining
what they were hoping for when they consulted an attorney. Students
quickly see that litigation is not necessarily a desirable method for ob-
taining the relief sought by the plaintiffs.
Of course, defendants and defense attorneys also have options,
and these too should be explored. A defendant who has been sued
has no choice initially but to be involved in litigation, but such a de-
fendant can choose to default or settle or suggest another form of
dispute resolution. These issues are examined below.
b. Litigation Is Not the Only Game in Town
In order to help future attorneys assist their clients in deciding
whether to commence litigation, we also need to teach our students
the differences between negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and liti-
gation and how these processes relate to one another. While it is not
possible, in a single civil procedure course, to spend large amounts of
time explaining all the nuances of each of these processes, we can and
should teach students the fundamental definitions. Many civil proce-
dure texts already include at least this minimal amount of informa-
tion. All students should learn, for example, that mediators do not
have the power to issue binding determinations or decide cases, but
that participants in mediation can reach agreements that will be bind-
ing. Students should also learn that binding arbitration agreements
are usually enforceable, and that binding arbitration decisions are
harder to vacate than determinations by trial courts. The differences
between binding and non-binding arbitration should be explained.
Professors may find it useful to use means other than lecture or
reading to explain the differences among these processes. Whereas
students have a good sense, from television and movies, of the nature
of trials, most have never seen a mediation or arbitration. Other
methods that can be used to explain these processes are videos, live
demonstrations in or outside of class, and talks by guest speakers. Lo-
105 JONATHAN HARR, A CML AcTION (1995).
106 GERALD M. STERN, THE BuALo CREEK DISASTER (1976).
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cal court administrators, judges, lawyers, or neutrals can often do a
good job of both explaining the nature of ADR processes and also
helping students to see how central these processes are to the life of
the typical litigator. Recall that the movie Erin Brockovich contains a
scene in which the plaintiffs' lawyers convince plaintiffs in a toxic tort
suit that their purposes would be better served by arbitration than
litigation.
In addition to explaining the basic differences between litigation,
negotiation, mediation, and arbitration, we also need to help our stu-
dents think about how to guide their clients in selecting among these
processes. Here, too, any case in the civil procedure text can be of
use. In discussing the Band's Refuse case from the Marcus and Redish
text, I assign half the students to play the role of plaintiffs' attorneys
and half to play the role of defense attorneys. In these roles, students
are asked to think about how to counsel their clients on the pros and
cons of these various procedural devices in addition to litigation.
Would it make sense for plaintiff or defendant to suggest mediation,
non-binding arbitration, or binding arbitration as an alternative to liti-
gation? I also have my students consider this question from the per-
spective of clients described in A Civil Action107 or The Buffalo Creek
Disaster. The point of these exercises is to help students begin to un-
derstand that no particular process is best for all disputes in all situa-
tions. Rather, each process has its pros and cons.
To the extent that we teach about the pros and cons of litigation
and the choices between litigation and other processes, we should also
test on these concepts. This is not difficult to do. I frequently give
students fact patterns and then ask them to advise their clients, inter
alia, on what would be the best procedural approach. While there is
no single "right" answer to these sorts of questions, students can and
do reveal their knowledge (or lack thereof) regarding procedural
options.
c. Court-Ordered and Contractually-Compelled ADR
We should also make sure our students know that the choice be-
tween litigation and other processes will not be completely up for
grabs. Rather, they need to learn that many federal and state courts
107 The question of whether the dispute underlying A Civil Action, HARR, supra
note 105, could or should have been mediated, and whether such mediation might
have succeeded, was discussed at an ADR conference several years ago by some of the
actual lawyers involved in the case. Whereas Jan Schlictmann, now an ADR devotee,
thought mediation might have proven quite useful, Jerry Facher and Bill Cheeseman
were much more negative.
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will compel that cases filed in court first proceed through settlement
conferences, mediation, early neutral evaluation, or non-binding arbi-
tration. Professors can provide this information by having students
read relevant rules or statutes, by having guest speakers explain local
processes, or by lecturing on the subject. I have found it useful to
have students examine local rules and websites covering these issues,
as these help students see that ADR is very much part of the legal
world with which they will be dealing.
In addition, students need to be aware that clients may have en-
tered into contracts, on a pre-dispute basis, that limit their procedural
options. As the clients may not even be aware of these procedural
constraints, lawyers need to be trained to look for pre-existing con-
tracts that may limit procedural options. One nice way to make this
point is to have students look at their own contracts, such as those
governing credit cards, phone service, or banking services. One can
also have students read any of the recent Supreme Court cases con-
firming that employees or consumers can be contractually mandated
to resolve their disputes through arbitration.108 The students will
quickly see that they have already unwittingly (for the most part)
waived their right to litigate disputes arising out of those contracts, in
that they have instead agreed to take such disputes to binding arbitra-
tion.' 09 Students should also be made aware that such pre-dispute
agreements to mediate or arbitrate future disputes are extremely com-
mon in particular contexts such as the construction industry, ship-
ping, franchise relationships, or international business deals.
d. The Inextricable Relationship Between Litigation and
Other Forms of Dispute Resolution
One of the hardest concepts to convey to students is the way that
litigation is linked to other forms of dispute resolution. Perhaps be-
cause of the way that we segregate litigation and ADR approaches
from one another, students often get the sense that an irrevocable
procedural choice is made early in the life of the dispute. To some
degree, the approaches described above can exacerbate this problem
if they are not handled properly. I have often had students either in
class or in exams state that a particular dispute is appropriate for ne-
gotiation or mediation, but not litigation.
108 Examples of such cases include Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105
(2001), and Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
109 One article that makes this point nicely is Demaine & Hensler, supra note 73
(reporting that approximately one-third of the major transactions in the typical con-
sumer's life were covered by mandatory arbitration provisions).
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The most direct way to handle this problem is to confront it di-
rectly. We must explain to students, for example, that a lawyer may
not have the luxury of choosing negotiation over litigation. To obtain
a good result for the client in negotiation, it may turn out that the
lawyer needs to commence or at least consider litigation. Also, we
must remind students that many disputes are commenced in litigation
but then (voluntarily or by court order) shifted to negotiation, media-
tion, or nonbinding arbitration. As well, although lawyers and clients
may decide at the outset to take a particular dispute to arbitration,
litigation may become necessary if issues arise as to the enforceability
of the arbitration agreement or award. Disputes that are negotiated
or even settled may later be brought to litigation if disagreements oc-
cur as to the nature of the agreement that was supposedly reached.
" We can also convey this inextricable relationship between litiga-
tion and other forms of dispute resolution by continuing to bring
up ADR at various points in our courses. The following are just a
few examples of the myriad ways in which this can be done.
" In the context of Rule 11110 or discovery disputes we might ask
students to consider whether mediation might be used to resolve
such matters.
" When we talk about motions to dismiss or for summaryjudgment,
and particularly partial motions, we can point out that these are
often used to affect the settlement value of a case. We can also
observe that pending motions or depositions often spark serious
settlement discussions.
" When we discuss pretrial conferences we should examine the role
judges and magistrates often play in settlements, and we can ask
students to consider whether it is appropriate for judges or magis-
trates to act as mediators and in which cases."1 I
" In looking at class actions we can let students know that ADR
mechanisms are often used to resolve the damages portions of
class actions after a settlement has been reached on the merits.' 12
We can also point out that companies are using arbitration
110 FED. R. Crv. P. 11.
111 SeeJamesJ. Alfini, Mediation's Coming of (Legal) Age, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 153,
154 (2002) (identifying the Uniform Mediation Act as a premier example of the
heightened interest, among lawyers and judges, in becoming mediators).
112 See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, A Glass Half Full, A Glass Half Empty: The Use of
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1587,
1616 (1995) (identifying that plaintiffs, in one case, were able to negotiate their indi-
vidual damage awards with the Dalkon Shield claimants' trust once a settlement was
reached with defendants on behalf of the entire class); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Tak-
ing the Mass Out of Mass Torts: Reflections of a Dalkon Shield Arbitrator on Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution, Judging Neutrality, Gender, and Process, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 513, 514
(1998) ("[In mass tort cases], parties use ADR to provide some form of an individual-
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clauses to try to eliminate class actions,
1 3 and that class actions
are sometimes handled by arbitrators.]
14
" As we examine personal jurisdiction doctrines we should note
that when disputants agree in advance to negotiate, mediate, or
arbitrate in a particular geographical setting they are consenting
to that geographic forum, at least for the ADR purposes. That is,
the Supreme Court's approach to forum selection clauses in Car-
nival Cruise115 should be analogized to the Supreme Court's ap-
proach to the approval of pre-dispute binding arbitration
agreements.
* When we look at the case of Louisville & Nashville Rail Road. v.
Mottley,1 1 6 exploring the nature of federal question jurisdiction,
we can also point out that this suit arose out of a settlement agree-
ment that was allegedly breached, using the opportunity to ex-
plain how settlement agreements are enforced.
" As jury trials are discussed, we can mention that one reason com-
panies are increasingly requiring customers or employees to re-
solve disputes through binding arbitration is to avoid the risks
entailed in jury trials.
* As we discuss appeals or preclusion we can mention the extent to
which results achieved through ADR are or are not appealable,
and may or may not have preclusive effect.
In short, it is easy to remind students of the many ways in which
litigation and other forms of dispute resolution relate to each other,
and we need not add many new readings to the text in order to foster
such discussions.
ized assessment of either the legal merits and liability, or the amount of compensation
to be paid to particular claimants or victims.").
113 See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 85, at 53-78 (explaining that clauses eliminating
a claimant's right to bring a class action are frequently found in arbitration provisions
and discussing both the proponents' and opponents' perspectives on this trend).
114 The Supreme Court's recent decision in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539
U.S. 444, 447 (2003), holds that arbitrators must make the determination as to
whether an ambiguous arbitration clause permits or proscribes arbitral class actions.
But, assuming the arbitrator finds that the arbitral class action is available, the law is
undeveloped as to the extent to which an arbitrator, or instead a judge, should make
determinations regarding the scope of the class, the nature of the class notice, and
whether a settlement should be approved. These choices raise fascinating due pro-
cess concerns. See Sternlight, supra note 85, at 38-53. The American Arbitration As-
sociation web site, http://www.adr.org, now contains a roster of class action
arbitration cases.
115 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
116 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
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e. Broadening the Due Process Discussions
Questions pertaining to the nature of procedural justice and due
process underlie the entire civil procedure course, and many of us
focus explicitly on procedural due process cases such as Fuentes v.
Shevin,117 Goldberg v. Kelly, 118 or Mathews v. Eldridge.119 As we examine
the concepts of due process, it is important to ask students to think
broadly about what procedural justice ought to entail. Although the
Supreme Court has tended to focus on efficiency and accuracy con-
cerns, together with the fundamental concepts of notice and a hear-
ing, this approach tends to take for granted an adversarial litigation-
oriented model. We can ask students to consider whether such hear-
ings are the best or only way to resolve all kinds of disputes. 20
There are a variety of ways in which we can encourage students to
broaden their thinking on the meaning of procedural justice. First,
aspects of the psychological literature on procedural justice can be
used to enrich our understanding of dispute resolution. In addition,
students can be asked to consider whether the formal adversarial
model is always the most just. For example, students can be asked to
design the procedural system under which they would like to be gov-
erned if they were stranded with their classmates on a desert island.1 21
Or, they can be asked to design procedures for resolving student con-
duct disputes. Students can also be asked to think about how disputes
are or have been handled by other societies, many of which rely far
117 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
118 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
119 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
120 As a technical matter, scholars do not agree whether or how the Due Process
Clause applies to consensual dispute resolution processes. Compare Nancy A. Welsh,
Disputants'Decision Control in Court-Connected Mediation: A Hollow Promise Without Proce-
dural Justice, 2002J. Disp. RESOL. 179, 187 [hereinafter Welsh, Disputants'Decision Con-
trol in Court-Connected Mediation] ("At a minimum, the procedural due process
jurisprudence raises doubts regarding the applicability of procedural due process to
court-connected mediation and other processes defined as 'consensual.'"), with Rich-
ard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution
and Public CivilJustice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 953-58 (2000) (urging that various forms
of ADR are often required to meet constitutional due process requirements). But,
regardless of differences of opinion regarding whether the Due Process Clause ap-
plies and what it might require, the policy question of what processes are "best" is up
for discussion. Professor Welsh points out that the Supreme Court's instrumental
approach to procedural due process has failed to take into account "an understand-
ing of the inherent value of procedural justice that is separate from its instrumental
effect on the outcomes in particular cases." Welsh, supra, at 190.
121 If this thought experiment is conducted on the first day of civil procedure, it
may well produce far less adversarial results than if it is conducted on the last day of
the course.
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more heavily on conciliation and other non-adversarial approaches
than we do. Within our own society, students can be asked to think
about how disputes are or ought to be resolved within a family. These
kinds of exercises will help them to see that the adversarial model is
not the only alternative and these exercises do not require substantial
additional materials.'
22
f. What to Cut
I have tried to show that it is not necessary to spend large num-
bers of hours of class time to integrate more ADR into the traditional
civil procedure curriculum. Instead, a great deal can be accomplished
by spending relatively few hours and then hearkening back to those
discussions at various points. However, given that many of us are be-
ing required to teach the basic civil procedure course in fewer and
fewer credits, I know many readers will be saying: "I can't add more
ADR because I would have to cut something else that is really core to
civil procedure."
Yet, we owe it to our students and the public to rethink what is
"really core" to civil procedure. Like many civil procedure professors,
I try to teach it all. I often feel that if I don't teach a particular aspect
of civil procedure, students will graduate knowing nothing about it
and be unable to be competent practitioners. At my school we don't
currently have an advanced civil procedure course, and even if we did,
many students would not take it. We only offer pretrial litigation occa-
sionally. Thus, I try to teach my students "everything": complaints,
answers, amendments, Rule 11, formal and informal discovery, join-
der of claims and parties, class actions, motions to dismiss, motions
for summary judgment, jury trials, pretrial conferences, personal juris-
diction, subject matter jurisdiction, supplemental jurisdiction, Erie,
choice of law, claim and issue preclusion-I am surely omitting some
critical topics.
Yet, perhaps sadly, we need to distinguish between what we teach
and what our students learn. Although I truly believe all those topics
are critically important, and although I believe I teach them reasona-
bly well, the reality (as revealed by my students' exams) shows that
even as of the date of the final exam my students do not learn or
retain all that I try to teach. How much of the details of civil proce-
dure will they then retain by the time they graduate from law school?
While we can comfort ourselves that at least some (many?) students
will retain enough to realize there is an issue they ought to research,
122 For a short article discussing some of these issues, see Jean R. Sternlight, ADR
Is Here: Preliminay Reflections on Where It Fits in a System ofJustice, 3 NEv. LJ. 289 (2003).
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this may or may not even be true. What will even the best students
retain about such subjects as Rule 19 (necessary and indispensable
parties), the details of when amendments are permitted or relation-
ship back allowed, the circumstances under which supplemental juris-
diction is allowed, the definitions of res judicata and collateral
estoppel, etc., etc.
In contrast, I think that the information we convey about the na-
ture of litigation and how it relates to other types of dispute resolution
is so basic that it will more easily be retained by our students. While I
have not tested the proposition empirically, I would be willing to wa-
ger that my students, upon graduation, still know the differences be-
tween the various forms of dispute resolution, have a sense how to
help their clients choose among these processes, and have an under-
standing as to how these processes relate to one another. They likely
also will have retained the idea that procedural justice may be broader
than an adversarial hearing.
For me, therefore, the bottom line is that it is worth cutting some
of the more technical aspects of the civil procedure course to make
room to devote some attention to ADR and the way it relates to litiga-
tion. I will not be so presumptuous as to make specific suggestions of
where cuts can or should be made, but will only suggest that profes-
sors ask themselves what material is both most important to new law-
yers and also most likely to be remembered by our new graduates. I
suggest that whereas ADR will make this cut, some other subjects may
not.
2. Improving ADR Courses
Just as the typical litigation courses pay insufficient attention to
ADR, so too does the typical ADR course pay insufficient attention to
litigation. First, although the survey course inevitably asks students to
compare various ADR approaches to litigation, it often does not give
students a good sense of how choices are made between ADR and
litigation in real life. For example, the typical survey course might
have students read Frank Sander's and Stephen Goldberg's article, Fit-
ting the Forum to the Fuss.12 3 This excellent article, which I have myself
often assigned, helps students to categorize various processes in terms
of such factors as their ability to minimize costs, maintain privacy, im-
prove relationships, make precedent, and maximize recovery. While
this is a valuable exercise, it may lead students to think that lawyers
123 Frank E. A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User-
Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOT. J. 49 (1994).
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choose a process, once and for all, at the outset of the dispute resolu-
tion process. We need to disavow students of this misperception.
ADR courses ought to spend significant time examining court-
connected forms of ADR. After all, a great deal of the ADR to which
lawyers and their clients are exposed is court-ordered. We therefore
should be examining the nature of these court-connected processes,
considering whether such processes are desirable from the perspec-
tive of prospective clients or the public at large, and analyzing legal
and policy issues relating to court-connected processes. Aspects of
ADR that are contained in rules of civil procedure should be part of
the ADR course. Why don't we typically talk about offers ofjudgment,
for example, in an ADR course?
124
Similarly, an ADR course ought to focus students' attention on
the contracts that do or might require alternate forms of dispute reso-
lution. Are such contracts desirable? Are they enforceable? How
should they be drafted? Dispute resolution agreements are a major
part of many lawyers' practice. If we don't examine them in an ADR
survey, when will students learn about such contracts?
As well, ADR courses ought to consider the legal issues that arise
with respect to various forms of ADR: when are dispute resolution
agreements enforceable and when are they not?; what kind of partici-
pation can be mandated by courts?; what confidentiality and privilege
rules apply?; how are results, obtained through an ADR process, en-
forced?; what kinds of preclusion apply to results obtained through
ADR?
With respect to negotiation, in particular, while the typical nego-
tiation course does contain a unit on the lawyer's role in negotiation
and also covers legal questions pertaining to the propriety of lying in
negotiation, many negotiation courses do not cover, or at least do not
devote much time to, issues lawyers commonly face in practice such as
the drafting of settlement agreements, the propriety (or not) of spe-
cific terms that might be included in negotiation agreements (e.g.,
confidentiality of results or prior conduct, agreements not to pursue
future litigation, agreements to destroy records, agreements to depub-
lish court decisions), the handling of multi-party settlements using
Mary Carter25 and other devices, the extent to which oral agreements
can be enforced, etc. In addition, shouldn't negotiation professors
spend some time helping students learn how to evaluate when it
124 FED. R. CIv. P. 68. The Supreme Court's decision in Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1
(1985), analyzing how the offer ofjudgment rule ought to be applied in fee-shifting
cases, is more often discussed in civil procedure than ADR courses.
125 Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 202 So. 2d 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
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makes more sense to continue litigating than to settle? I recently
taught both pretrial litigation and negotiation in the same semester
and was shocked when I realized that I was only teaching about the
drafting of settlement agreements in the pretrial litigation class. Does
that make sense?
With respect to mediation, isn't it odd that such courses often
devote only a week or so to mediation advocacy and typically spend
little time on the enforceability of agreements to mediate or of agree-
ments reached in mediation? Such legal issues as confidentiality are
usually covered but are certainly not the focus of the course. 126 Court-
connected mediation programs are likely mentioned, but issues of
compulsory attendance or mediation in good faith are probably not
central. Mediation mandated by statute or administrative rule is rarely
emphasized. Nor do most mediation courses put much, if any, focus
on the process by which courts approve or disapprove agreements
reached in mediation.
127
Arbitration courses do certainly deal with litigation, as the typical
arbitration course focuses substantially on Supreme Court and other
cases examining the enforceability of arbitration agreements and
awards. However, the typical arbitration course likely does not spend
much time on fascinating issues that bridge the fields of arbitration
and litigation, such as the choice of court in which arbitration clauses
or awards should be enforced or attacked, the propriety of arbitral
class actions, 128 the application of res judicata or collateral estoppel
doctrines to arbitration awards, or the use of antisuit injunctions to
deal with interjurisdictional disputes over the enforcement of arbitra-
tion clauses or awards. 129 Such courses often neglect court connected
arbitration programs and may not discuss the drafting of arbitration
clauses.
In short, while ADR courses certainly spend more time on litiga-
tion than litigation courses spend on ADR, the theme of such ADR
courses tends to be whether or how to use ADR instead of litigation.
126 See KOVACH, supra note 17, which dedicates seventy-two of its 588 pages to
confidentiality. Likewise, ALFINI ET AL., supra note 17, at 193-244, dedicates one sec-
tion within one chapter to the topic (fifty-one of the book's 608 pages).
127 See ALFINI ET AL., supra note 17, at 284-91 (discussing enforceability in one
section of one chapter (thirteen pages)); KOVACH, supra note 17, at 356-85 (address-
ing the issue of enforceability in one part of one chapter (twenty-nine pages)).
128 For a discussion of the propriety of arbitral class actions, see Sternlight, supra
note 85.
129 For a discussion of the use of antisuit injunctions to deal with interjurisdic-
tional disputes over the enforcement of arbitration clauses or awards, see Sternlight,
supra note 78.
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In part, the makeup of ADR courses reflects the preferences of the
teachers of such courses. Professors of ADR typically like to teach
courses that are different from traditional law school courses, and
often include lots of role plays, videos, and other fun forms of learn-
ing. Such professors often prefer to focus on interests, problem solv-
ing, listening skills, creativity, psychology, and non-legal concerns.
Indeed, many professors who teach the ADR survey course have said
that they like the arbitration portion of the course the least, in large
part because it (and arbitration itself) is so similar to the more tradi-
tional litigation-oriented law school course.
ADR professors who read this article are likely to say (and most
understandably): "Why should I cover litigation when the rest of law
school is devoted to litigation?" Yet, upon reflection, this defense fails
our students. Omitting discussion of litigation from ADR courses
leaves our students with the impression that there are lawyers who fo-
cus only or predominantly on ADR, rather than litigation, whereas in
truth such advocates are extremely rare, if not nonexistent. 13 0 Moreo-
ver, ADR professors' reluctance to discuss litigation, combined with
litigation professors' reluctance to discuss ADR, leaves our students
largely, if not totally, ignorant as to some of the most important re-
sponsibilities they will have in practice. Practicing lawyers need to
know how to decide among procedural processes throughout the life
cycle of a dispute; they need to know how to evaluate the desirability
of settlement relative to litigation; they need to know about offer of
judgment rules; and they need to know how to draft settlement agree-
ments. Yet, for the most part, neither litigation nor ADR courses see
fit to teach about these important matters.'1
3
ADR professors will likely complain: "How can I teach all this ma-
terial on litigation when I don't even have time to teach all I want to
teach about ADR?" Again, this response is most understandable, and
certainly I have felt this pressure myself. Yet, as I urged the litigation
professors to do, so too must the ADR professors step back and ask
130 An example of lawyers who have chosen to practice ADR, in lieu of litigation,
are those who have elected to practice "collaborative lawyering." See supra note 97.
131 The segmentation of ADR from litigation is part of a more general phenome-
non of segmentation in law school. Though we separate out the teaching of con-
tracts, torts, criminal law, etc., from one another, in real life clients do not come to a
lawyer with a problem from a single field. Instead, clients come to lawyers with
problems that may well span multiple courses. One of a lawyer's toughest jobs is to
figure out what claims or defenses a client may have based on the jumble of factual
information that is presented. Yet, law schools do very little to prepare lawyers for this
most difficult task. Clinical courses are one answer to this problem, as they inevitably
require law students to draw from multiple courses.
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themselves: "What are the most important lessons our students need
to take from law school?"
From a teaching standpoint, we cannot continue to segment and
segregate litigation from other forms of dispute resolution (adminis-
trative processes and ADR). While professors may defend their prac-
tice with the thought that students can always sign up for those
"other" courses, this solution cannot solve the problem that (1) the
ADR courses are almost inevitably given less attention, and (2) teach-
ing these matters separately fails to convey to students the inevitable
connection between multiple forms of dispute resolution. In addi-
tion, our segregation of ADR from litigation causes us to neglect im-
portant connections in our scholarship and public policy discussions,
as discussed below.
B. Focusing on Justice
Whereas the bulk of this Article has focused on practical nuts and
bolts issues, the segregation of litigation and ADR in our thinking and
in our writing also has another possibly more pernicious effect: it un-
dermines our full consideration of the nature and purpose of our en-
tire system of justice. To put this more positively, by recognizing that
litigation and non-litigation forms of dispute resolution are all part of
our justice system, we can improve our policy analysis. Too many
proceduralists focus only on the realm (litigation or mediation or ar-
bitration or administrative proceedings) with which they are most
familiar. 132
By focusing on formal and informal procedures, we can more
readily consider the multiple purposes of our justice system. Too
many litigation scholars tend to assume that the only, or at least pri-
mary, purpose of ourjustice system is to provide public justice, includ-
ing such important features as public precedent, access, and
conformity to the rule of law.133 But equally, too many ADR scholars
132 Judith Resnik is a very important exception to this general trend. In a series of
books, articles and presentations, she has been urging proceduralists to cross the
boundaries between civil and criminal, and between litigation, ADR, and agency
processes. See, e.g., Fiss & RESNIK, supra note 5.
133 See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (identifying
settlement as problematic because it creates a lack of a foundation for continuing
judicial involvement, deprives courts of the opportunity to interpret disputes, and
creates peace between the parties, but does not create justice because the decision
does not become precedential for other citizens); see also Owen M. Fiss, The Forms of
Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18 (1979) (arguing that "the ultimate subject matter of the
lawsuit or focus of the judicial inquiry is not ... particularized and discrete events, but
rather a social condition that threatens important constitutional values and the orga-
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tend to assume that the most treasured aspect of a justice system
ought to be allowing individuals to choose the process or result that is
best for them.
Some of the best procedural scholars are beginning to cross these
bridges by recognizing that our justice system has multiple goals. For
example, Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow's 1995 article, Whose Dis-
pute Is It Anyway?, considers whether it should be public or private
interests that determine whether settlement of a particular dispute is
appropriate.1 34 Professor Judith Resnik's work emphasizes that
whereas ADR was once considered outside the judicial sphere, it has
clearly now been brought inside that tent. 135 Resnik urges that we
should examine all types of procedure, adjudicative, administrative,
criminal, and ADR in considering "what constitutes fair and just pro-
cess. '1 3 6 Professor Robert Baruch Bush has urged that mediation
serves not only private interests, such as saving time or money, or re-
storing relationships, but also public interests in reconciliation, com-
munity, and the like. 137 Some of my own prior work also examines
the relationship between formal and informal, adversarial and non-
adversarial, forms of justice.
138
Focusing broadly on not only litigation but also on other forms of
dispute resolution also allows us to explore more fully the nature of
procedural justice. Beginning in the 1970s, some social psychologists
nizational dynamic that creates and perpetuates that condition" and, therefore, the
public access and precedential values of adjudication are particularly important);
Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution Move-
ment Is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REv. 165 (2003) (identifying that
some plaintiffs prefer public vindication of their rights to private resolution of their
disputes); Deborah R. Hensler, Suppose It's Not True: Challenging Mediation Ideology,
2002J. Disp. RESOL. 81 [hereinafter Hensler, Suppose It's Not True] (recognizing that
some litigants value the publicity of adjudication).
134 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?, 83 GEO. L.J. 2663 (1995).
135 E.g., Judith Resnik, For Owen M. Fiss: Some Reflections on the T7iumph and the
Death of Adjudication, 58 U. Mismi L. REv. 173, 186-87 (2003) ("Techniques such as
mediation, arbitration, and settlement conferences-once termed 'extrajudicial'-
have become regular features of civil processes.").
136 JUDITH RESNIK, PROCESSES OF THE LAW: UNDERSTANDING COURTS AND THEIR AL.
TERNATIVES 146 (2004); see also Fiss & RESNIK, supra note 5.
137 Robert A. Baruch Bush, Mediation and Adjudication, Dispute Resolution and Ideol-
ogy: An Imaginary Conversation, 3J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1 (1989).
138 See Sternlight, supra note 122, at 296 ("Recognizing that various forms of dis-
pute resolution are intertwined by no means implies that they are the same . . .");
Jean R. Sternlight, In Search of the Best Procedure for Enforcing Employment Discrimination
Laws: A Comparative Analysis, 78 TUL. L. REv. 1401 (2004) (comparing how employ-
ment discrimination laws are enforced in the United States, Britain, and Australia and
using this data to consider the benefits of various approaches to dispute resolution).
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did a series of empirical studies with respect to when disputants per-
ceive a dispute resolution process to be 'just." This research revealed
that procedural justice (how the dispute is resolved) is at least as im-
portant to disputants as the ultimate substantive result.13 9 Procedural
justice researchers have found three elements are key to disputants'
experience of whether a process is procedurally just: (1) their percep-
tion that they had an opportunity to voice their concerns and present
evidence to a third party (whether directly or through an agent), (2)
their perception that the third party actually considered these con-
cerns, and (3) their perception that they were treated in a dignified
and respectful manner.
140
Sadly, relatively little work has been done with respect to how
these insights might apply to ADR as it exists today. The original pro-
cedural justice studies focused primarily on litigation, distinguishing
between adversarial and inquisitorial processes at times.14' While sub-
sequent work did purport to discuss processes called bilateral bargain-
ing, mediation, and arbitration, researchers today have recognized
that the definitions used do not comport with those used today.
142
Even more frustrating, none of the processes examined resembled
mediation as we define it today.
143
Equally sadly, although one might think that those emphasizing
civil procedure would focus a great deal of attention on the meaning
of procedural justice, in fact the subject is sadly neglected. While civil
procedure scholars and teachers often ask themselves and their stu-
dents to consider pieces of the justice question, such as how adver-
sarial our system ought to be, or how much discovery we ought to
allow, or how Rule 11 sanctions ought to be designed, or whether jury
trials make sense, it is far rarer that a scholar or teacher focused on
civil procedure would ask whether disputes are best resolved through
negotiation or mediation or arbitration or administrative processes
139 A great deal of the original work in this area was done by Laurens Walker, John
Thibaut, E. Allan Lind, and Tom R. Tyler. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988); E. Allen Lind, Procedural Justice,
Disputing, and Reactions to Legal Authorities, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES
177 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1998) (summarizing studies); Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan
Lind, Procedural Justice, in Handbook ofJustice Research in Law 65 (Joseph Sanders &
V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001); Laurens Walker et al., Reactions of Participants and Observ-
ers to Modes of Adjudication, 4J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 295 (1974).
140 Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 45, at 820.
141 Hensler, Suppose It's Not True, supra note 133, at 85-95 (citing John Thibaut
and Laurens Walker's studies, the results of which may be found in Laurens Walker et
al., supra note 139).
142 Id. at 86-87.
143 Id. at 87.
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rather than through courts. Teachers and scholars of civil procedure
have an understandable tendency to take courts for granted.
However, and most fortunately, two scholars have recently begun
to focus on the procedural justice literature and specifically are look-
ing at what insights that literature may provide with respect to choices
between and among forms of litigation and alternative dispute resolu-
tion. Professors Deborah R. Hensler and Nancy A. Welsh have each
begun to consider this question, albeit, and most interestingly, com-
ing to quite different conclusions. Professor Hensler concludes,
based on her review of the procedural justice literature, that dispu-
tants want third-party neutrals to resolve their disputes based on fact
and law. 144 Yet, Professor Welsh, after reviewing the same studies, dis-
putes Hensler's conclusion that disputants view processes as more pro-
cedurally fair if they cede decisional control to a third party.
145
Instead, argues Welsh, such studies show that "the locus of decision
control is less important to litigants' perceptions of procedural justice
than process elements-voice, consideration, even-handedness and
dignity."1 46 With respect to mediation, Welsh has, for example, shown
that the precise way in which the mediation is set up can make a great
deal of difference to disputants. 147 Regardless of whether one ulti-
mately agrees with Hensler or Welsh, or yet another perspective, the
key contribution both scholars have made is to apply the procedural
justice literature to both litigation and other dispute resolution
processes in an attempt to devise a more just procedural system.
Building on the work of all of these and other scholars, I have
begun to consider, in several prior articles, where ADR fits in the
broader scheme of a system of justice. Thus, in one article I prelimi-
narily conclude that societies ought to consider broad categories of
144 Id. at 95.
145 Nancy A. Welsh, Disputants'Decision Control in Court-Connected Mediation, supra
note 120, at 185.
146 Id. at 187.
147 Nancy A. Welsh, Stepping Back Through the Looking Glass: Real Conversations with
Real Disputants About Institutionalized Mediation and Its Value, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp.
RESOL. 573 (2004). In a study of voluntary mediation sessions between school district
officials and parents of children in the special education program, Welsh found that
while participants valued both evaluative and facilitative interventions, they were most
appreciative of particular mediator actions that could occur in either context. Id. at
671. Parents particularly wanted the opportunity to express their views and be heard
by the school district officials. The district officials most valued the extent to which
the mediator helped the parents understand the district's perspective. See id. at
624-25. Private caucuses, while potentially valuable, were also dangerous in that par-
ties sometimes feared the striking of private deals and the loss of mediator impartial-
ity. Id. at 669-71.
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both private148 and public interests1 4 9 as they establish an array of in-
stitutions to resolve legal claims. In a second article, I research how
various countries resolve employment discrimination disputes and
show that their varying approaches include litigation, arbitration, ad-
ministrative processes, and mediation.1 50 Interestingly, however, the
countries each used multiple approaches and then also tended to cy-
cle between the more and less formal approaches. 151 I urge that this
phenomenon results from each country's attempt, perhaps uncon-
scious, to serve both public and private interests through its system of
justice. 152 While these and other scholars' articles are only beginning
to address the comprehensive question of how societies ought to de-
sign a system of justice, they do at minimum help illustrate why it is so
critical to consider both litigation and non-litigation approaches in
asking such questions.
Another important benefit of merging our analysis of litigation
and other dispute resolution processes is that it encourages us to con-
sider the use of new dispute resolution techniques that may lie some-
where in between litigation and traditional forms of ADR (mediation,
arbitration, and negotiation). For example, in my home jurisdiction
of Las Vegas, the Eighth Judicial District Court has recently developed
a procedural device known as the "short trial. ' 153 An amalgam of pub-
lic and private, formal and informal, the short trial includes the fol-
lowing features:
(1) The goal is to hear all cases within four months of filing. 154
(2) Cases are presided over by a local lawyer (called a judge pro
tem) rather than by a "real" judge;155 pro tern judges are com-
148 I suggest that private interests include (1) securing a substantively fair/just re-
sult, (2) resolving claims in a procedurally just manner, and (3) achieving other per-
sonal and emotional goals such as reconciliation. Sternlight, supra note 122, at 299.
149 I urge that public interests include not only resolving disputes in a fair and just
manner, equitably enforcing laws adopted by the society, and encouraging adherence
to law, but also helping to create balance, harmony, and reconciliation among mem-
bers of the society. Id. at 300.
150 Sternlight, supra note 138.
151 Id. at 1489.
152 Id. at 1487-89.
153 The Nevada Legislature approved the Nevada Supreme Court's right to au-
thorize short trial as a legitimate alternative to court-imposed, non-binding arbitra-
tion in 1991. Act of May 28, 1999, ch. 334, 1999 Nev. Stat. 1380 (codified as amended
at NEV. REV. STAT. 38.258 (2002)). The Short Trial program was implemented in July
2000. See SHORT TRIAL PROGRAMS: RULES & FoRms (2002), available at http://
www.co.clark. nv.us/district-Court/arbitrationforms/ShortTrialRules.pdf.
154 NEV. SuP. CT. R. Part V-B, NEV. SHORT TRIAL R. 2.
155 Id. R. 17.
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pensated by the parties at a rate of $150 per hour, to a maxi-
mum of $1500 per case.1
56
(3) In jury cases a four person jury is used, taken from the regular
jury pool, and this jury resolves cases by majority vote.
1 57
(4) An emphasis is placed on speedy and efficient resolution of all
claims. Each side is strictly limited to three hours in which to
present its case (including opening, closing, direct and cross
examination); 15 8 voir dire is limited to fifteen minutes per
side;15 9 no formal record is made of the proceedings unless
paid for by the parties;1 60 and no bailiff or court clerk is pre-
sent to assist with the hearing.
16 1
(5) Nevada Rules of Evidence and Civil Procedure generally apply,
although each side is required to file evidentiary objections in
advance, and each side is permitted to provide the jury with a
book of evidence.
Under the current system, short trials are heard only in those
cases in which both sides agree, voluntarily.
1 62 Awards made in the
short trial program are subject to challenge only on the limited
grounds by which binding arbitration awards may be vacated.
1 63
Under a reform proposal currently being considered by the Nevada
Supreme Court, resort to the short trial would be mandatory for all
cases in which a trial de novo was sought following mandatory non-
binding arbitration and for all cases not resolved in voluntary media-
tion. 164 This proposal would also broaden appellate rights, to permit
short trial determinations to be appealed in the same manner as local
court rulings.
1 65
Whether one likes the idea of the short trial or not, certainly all
must agree that such programs, whether voluntary or mandatory, raise
156 Id. R. 18.
157 Id. R. 5.
158 Id. R. 6. The fifteen minutes allowed for each side to conduct voir dire is not
deducted from the three-hour time allotment for each side to present its case. Id. R.
5.
159 Id. R. 5.
160 Id. R. 4.
161 Id. R. 21.
162 Id. R. 1.
163 Short Trial Rule 16 permits review of an award only pursuant to Nevada Re-
vised Statute 38.115 (for modification or correction of an award) and Nevada Revised
Statute 38.145 (for vacating an award).
164 William C. Turner, Short Trial Committee, Proposed Short Trial Program
Amendments & Revisions ADKT No. 310 (Oct. 30, 2003) (unpublished, filed with the
Clerk of the Supreme Court of Nevada), available at http://www.nvsupremecourt.us/
DOCS/reports/rpt_031 IADKT31OSupp.pdf.
165 Id. at 6.
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fascinating policy and legal issues. To consider adequately the desira-
bility and permissibility of such programs, policy makers and scholars
will need to be well-versed in the theory and practice of both litigation
and ADR.
CONCLUSION
It is critical that we break down the artificial walls between civil
procedure and ADR. Whether from the perspective of teaching, prac-
tice, policy, or scholarship it should be clear that it makes no sense to
cabin each of these procedural approaches exclusively into its own
course or body of literature. As we celebrate the fifty-year birthday of
Brown v. Board of Education,166 it is also time to consider the integra-
tion of civil procedure and ADR as well as to reexamine the signifi-
cance legal scholars pay to each field. Just as Brown has helped us
move toward substantive justice, such rethinking will help us to work
toward improvements in procedural justice.
166 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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